What is the Double Payment Argument?

The "double-payment" or "double jeopardy" argument asserts that if Christ paid the penalty for the sins of all people, then God could not justly send anyone to hell, for that would be demanding payment for the same sins twice: once from Christ on the cross and a second time from those in hell. Thus, Christ must have only paid for the sins of the elect. For the sake of clarity, the argument can be put as the following syllogism:

1. If Christ died for a person, that person cannot fail to be finally saved.
2. Some people are not finally saved.
3. Therefore, Christ did not die for the sins of some people.[1]

John Owen17th Century English Puritan church leader, academic, and theologian who wrote a famous work defending limited atonement entitled, The Death of Death in the Death of Christ. framed the argument in terms of a legal and commercial transaction between a debtor and creditor:

First, if the full debt of all be paid to the utmost extent of the obligation, how comes it to pass that so many are shut up in prison to eternity, never freed from their debts? Secondly, if the Lord, as a just creditor, ought to cancel all obligations and surcease all suits against such as have their debts so paid, whence is it that his wrath smokes against some to all eternity? Let none tell me that it is because they walk not worthy of the benefit bestowed; for that not walking worthy is part of the debt which is fully paid, for (as it is in the third inference) the debt so paid is all our sins. Thirdly, is it probable that God calls any to a second payment, and requires satisfaction of them for whom, by his own acknowledgment, Christ hath made that which is full and sufficient?[2]

Notably, Owen's argument highlights the scope of the sins paid for by Christ, which includes the sin of unbelief. From this, he concludes that a person who has been atoned cannot suffer punishment for their unbelief in hell. For Owen, the atonement is full and sufficient to cancel all obligations to punishment from sin, so there is simply no sin to punish if all are under Christ's atonement.

R. C. SproulAmerican Reformed theologian, pastor, author, and founder of Ligonier Ministries. He wrote many influential books including: The Holiness of God, Chosen by God, and Everyone's a Theologian. puts the central force of the argument as follows:

When we speak of the sufficiency of the atonement, however, we must ask the question, Is it a sufficient satisfaction of divine justice? If it is sufficient to satisfy the demands of God's justice, then no one needs to worry about future punishment. If God accepts payment of one person's moral debt from another, will he then exact payment of the same debt later by the person himself? The answer is obviously no.[3]

Furthermore, many advocates of limited atonement use Colossians 2:14, which states that on the cross, Christ "canceled the certificate of debt consisting of decrees against us, which was hostile to us; and He has taken it out of the way, having nailed it to the cross." It is often asked how our sin debt can be held against us if it was canceled at the cross by Christ.

My response to this argument will be a disagreement with the first premise that "if Christ died for a person, that person cannot fail to be finally saved." I will defend the view that even though Christ died for all people, there is a condition of faith that must be met in order for atonement to be applied to an individual. My response will be structured into three parts. First, I will point out that the argument is a theological one that is never asserted in Scripture and is directly at odds with many passages of Scripture. Second, I will identify what I believe to be the root flaw in the argument, drawing on the writing of Neil Chambers and David Allen, that Owen's view relies on a mistaken commercial view of the atonement. And third, I argue that the double-payment argument is inconsistent with the biblical concepts of grace, justification, and faith.

1. Double-Payment is a Mistaken Theological Argument

It must first be noted that the double-payment argument is a theological argument, not an exegetical one. Scripture nowhere states the double-payment argument nor the central premise that if Christ died for a person, they cannot fail to be saved.

Beyond the passages which teach that Christ died for all people (Jhn 1:29; 3:16; 1Co 15:3-4; 2Co 5:14-21; 1Ti 2:4-6; 4:10; Tit 2:11-14; Heb 2:9; 1Jo 2:1-2; 4:14), the words of the apostle Peter are in opposition to the central premise of the double-payment argument. He notes that some of those atoned for are also destroyed in judgement. Peter describes false teachers who were "bought" (agarazō) by Christ, then "brought swift destruction upon themselves" (2Pe 2:1; Jude 4). Likewise, in the last supper, Christ states that his blood was "poured out" for them, speaking to his apostles, and brought attention to the fact that Judas was present: "the hand of the one betraying Me is with Mine on the table" (Luk 22:20-21). Judas then betrayed Christ and was called a "son of destruction" (Jhn 17:12).

Furthermore, Scripture teaches that even if atonement is purchased for a person, it must be applied to them for them to be saved. Paul makes a distinction between what has been called the objective and subjective aspects of reconciliation. The objective aspect is that of Christ dying for sin at the cross, and the subjective aspect is atonement applied to a person by faith in Christ. Paul speaks of God in Christ "reconciling the world to Himself," and then appeals, "we beg you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God" (2Co 5:19-20). The subjective aspect of reconciliation, the application of the atonement, does not occur until a person puts their faith in Christ.

Theological arguments are not in and of themselves problematic. All Christians must make use of what has been called "good and necessary consequence." However, deductive theological arguments should be treated with caution. They can, unfortunately, rely on unintended extrapolations of the biblical authors. And reliance on these arguments can sometimes be a crutch for concepts not taught in Scripture. Yet, we cannot simply hand-wave the argument for this reason. The next section will be devoted to identifying the precise place where the argument runs afoul.

2. The Problematic Commercial View of Atonement

Neil ChambersPresbyterian pastor and theologian points out in his critique of John Owen that his argument depends on reading the biblical metaphors of "debt" and "ransom" as literal commercial mechanisms of atonement.[4] Within the double-payment argument, sin is equated to debt, and debt is said to be canceled at the cross, leaving us free from punishment under the law. This language of sin as debt is indeed found in Scripture, but shouldn't be taken to speak of the actual, literal mechanism of atonement. Scripture teaches that faith is a necessary condition to appropriate the work that Christ accomplished on the cross. Atonement must be applied to a person before they are no longer subject to final punishment.

Even if we assume a strict commercial understanding of atonement, double-payment never occurs in the unlimited atonement view. The situation of double-payment occurs when the same person is punished twice for the same sin. This, however, is not the case. Christ is punished on the cross for the sin of humanity, and the lost are punished in hell for their own sin. Since there is no equivalence between Christ being punished on the cross and the lost being punished in hell, there is truly no double jeopardy.

However, the point remains that two people are indeed punished for the sin debt of one. Even if double payment never occurs, we can still ask whether this is an issue for unlimited atonement. Here, the difference between commercial debt and criminal debt is useful. David Allen gives examples to illustrate these differences and their relationship to the atonement question:[5]

1. First, imagine you and a friend are dining at a restaurant, and when the bill comes, your friend realizes that they have no money. If you kindly offer to pay the bill, the debt is satisfied, and the restaurant owner is happy. In this situation of commercial debt, it doesn't matter who pays, but once the debt is paid, you and your friend are free to leave the restaurant.
2. Second, imagine instead that your friend lacks money and then loses his mind, robs the restaurant of $500 in cash, and runs away. Out of your kindness, you decide to pay the restaurant owner the stolen $500. When your friend is later apprehended by the police, they are not free to go simply because you paid the money back. This example illustrates that commercial debt is distinct from criminal debt. Justice demands that your friend face the legal consequences of their robbery. Sins are not quantifiable debts (like dollars), but are moral crimes against a holy God that require a penal satisfaction. This is the precise reason why God, as the moral lawgiver, has the authority to set a condition for how that payment is applied.

This analogy is not meant to show that moral guilt is not the same as commercial debt. If God accepts a substitute in the case of sin, then that acceptance occurs within God's own will and authority, not because sin functions like a literal commercial debt.

The English theologian John DavenantEnglish academic and bishop of Salisbury who led the English delegates at the Synod of Dort, who was a moderate-CalvinistA Calvinist who rejects the doctrine of limited atonement., gave the parable of a king who throws traitors of the kingdom in jail, with a price set on their release too high for them to pay.[6] The son of the king, out of grace and mercy, pays the debt that each of the men owed. And he states that any of them can be released on condition of their swearing allegiance to him as their Lord and Master. Those who choose to swear allegiance to the King's son are set free. They are no longer held subject to the punishment of the crime debt, as they accepted the son's payment on their behalf. The others disregard the offer made by the son and remain in prison. Has the king acted unjustly by not releasing those who did not meet the condition for their release? The answer is no. The king himself has the authority to set the condition for the son's payment to be applied.

Owen is right that unbelief is a sin, and therefore Christ paid for it on the cross. But this does not necessitate that Christ's atonement must be applied to every person for whom it was made. The unbeliever is not condemned because unbelief was left unpaid for, nor because God exacts a second payment for the same crime. Rather, he is condemned because he remains outside the condition for the benefits of Christ's work to be applied. The failure to meet the condition of faith is indeed sin, but the non-application of the atonement is not a second punishment for that sin. Even if their unbelief is paid for by Christ, an unbeliever still doesn't believe, and therefore does not meet the condition required to appropriate Christ's work on the cross. The double-payment argument and a commercial view of atonement collapse the distinction between Christ's atoning work and the application of atonement by God's appointed condition of faith.

3. Further Issues For Grace, Justification, and Faith

On the flip side of the coin, the success of the double-payment argument results in several serious issues for our understanding of grace, justification, and faith. In other words, the argument proves too much.

1. The double-payment argument negates the concept of grace. If the payment for sin is made under a commercial view of sin as debt, then the elect are owed salvation. God is obligated to save the elect, which removes grace from forgiveness. Charles Hodge19th-century American Presbyterian theologian and principal of Princeton Theological Seminary critiqued the commercial view, "[t]here is no grace in accepting a pecuniary satisfaction. It cannot be refused. It ipso facto liberates. The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free; and that without any condition."[7] Another theologian Ralph Wardlaw18th and 19th-century Scottish Congregationalist minister, writer, and abolitionist. stated, "there can be no grace in bestowing what it would be an act of injustice to withhold."[8]
2. The double-payment argument implies the elect are justified at the cross, not when they believe. Under a commercial view of atonement, if paid debt automatically liberates the debtor, then the elect, before their faith, cannot be held subject to any punishment. Some may point out that from a Calvinist view, the elect will certainly believe and accept the gospel at some point in their life, meaning that no atoned person will be punished. However, this does not help. Notice that since the penalty of sin is removed, the elect cannot even be held subject to punishment. In the commercial view of atonement, the elect are born justified, for no punishment can justly be held against them. However, Scripture states that even those who are saved now were once "children of wrath" (Eph. 2:3).
3. The double-payment argument undermines the role of faith by denying any condition in salvation. Remember the critique of Hodge again: "The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free..." If the elect cannot be held subject to punishment, they are already saved. They may not be in a saving relationship with Christ, but they certainly cannot be subject to the debt of their sin. This is inconsistent with Scripture's teaching that faith is a necessary condition for salvation. This issue led Owen to extend the commercial understanding of sin as a debt to include faith as a commodity that is purchased by Christ at the cross. This "distorts the nature of faith and the reception of grace," Allen observed, "by taking a relational term predominantly seen as a human activity and responsibility and transferring it into a different field of relations—namely, commerce and rights."[9]